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On Measuring Quantitative Interpretations of Reasonable Doubt 
 
Abstract 
Beyond reasonable doubt represents a probability value that acts as the criterion for 
conviction in criminal trials. We introduce the membership function (MF) method as a new 
tool for measuring quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt. Experiment 1 
demonstrated that three different methods (i.e., direct rating, decision theory-based, and MF) 
provided significantly different and uncorrelated interpretations of reasonable doubt, although 
all methods predicted verdicts equally well, and showed inter-individual variability in 
interpretations. In Experiment 2 only the direct rating method demonstrated a significant 
effect of judicial instructions on reasonable doubt. In both Experiments, the MF method 
showed intra-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt. The methods may 
be capturing different aspects of the concept of reasonable doubt. These findings have 
implications for the validity of past research findings on reasonable doubt, and for the utility 
of triangulation of methods in future research.  
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In criminal trials, it is difficult if not impossible to determine what actually occurred, 
and so decision makers rely on a standard of proof that specifies the degree of belief in guilt 
required, in terms of probability, before conviction. In this way, the standard acts as a 
criterion for making verdicts. In many adversarial systems such as the Anglo-North 
American, beyond reasonable doubt is the standard of proof used in criminal trials (see 
Shapiro, 1991). This represents a principle of due process (Newman, 1993) which is designed 
to minimize false convictions by setting a stringent criterion (high probability) for conviction, 
albeit, at the expense of possible false acquittals (see Arkes & Mellors, 2001; and DeKay, 
1996). It is generally agreed that this is the most stringent standard in law, and should 
represent a value above .90 (see Newman, 1983; United States v. Fatico, 1978; which does 
not imply the standard should be quantified). 
Studies measuring judges and mock jurors’ quantitative interpretations of reasonable 
doubt have found that interpretations are sometimes below and sometimes around .90, and 
there are inter-individual differences in interpretations (for a review see Hastie, 1993). 
However, researchers have used different methods. Dane (1985, p. 143) demonstrated that 
different methods yielded different interpretations, and that some methods provided 
interpretations that better matched “recreated” verdicts with actual verdicts (or had greater 
validity). In this paper, we compare two commonly used methods against a new method 
which has not been previously used to measure quantitative interpretations of reasonable 
doubt. The membership function method was developed to measure people’s quantitative 
interpretations of linguistic probabilities in general such as “very likely” (Karelitz, Budescu, 
& Wallsten, 2000). Two experiments examine the effect of method on measurement of 
quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt. Such research can have implications for law-
makers, legal professionals, and researchers. Determining how methods can impact research 
findings can help law-makers evaluate the reliability and validity of past findings on 
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quantifying reasonable doubt. It can also help future researchers choose the most effective 
and efficient method in research on standards of proof. Ultimately, a better understanding of 
how people interpret standards of proof can help legal professionals appreciate how they are 
used by jurors. 
Measuring Quantitative Interpretations of Reasonable Doubt 
In measuring quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt it is assumed that, given 
the evidence, people assess the probability that the defendant committed the crime as 
charged. If the probability of commission is greater than the interpretation of the standard 
then an individual will convict (find the defendant guilty), otherwise the individual will 
acquit. The standard of proof represents the balance placed between a defendant’s rights to 
freedom and society’s rights to be protected from crime. As a principle of due process, 
reasonable doubt puts the balance in favor of the defendant. Researchers have measured 
peoples’ quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt, particularly, as evidence indicates 
that interpretations affect verdicts (e.g., Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro & Stanton, 
1985; Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, 1976). 
McCauliff (1982) reported that the value of reasonable doubt ranged from 50% to 
100% with a mean of 90% across judges. (Researchers often use percentages instead of 
probabilities). Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington (1983) found that on average members of the 
public interpreted reasonable doubt as .92. Martin and Schum (1987) demonstrated that 
students interpreted the standard as from .91 to .99 across offence types. However, other 
studies have found that mean interpretations of reasonable doubt are somewhat below .90 for 
judges (e.g., Simon, 1969; Simon & Mahan, 1971) and mock jurors (students; e.g., Horowitz 
& Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr et al., 1976; Nagel, 
1979; Nagel & Neef, 1979; Simon, 1970; Simon & Mahan, 1971). The above body of 
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research also reveals wide inter-individual differences across peoples’ interpretations of 
reasonable doubt.  
Effect of Judicial Instructions 
 One potential source of the variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt lies in its 
imprecision. Jurors are uncertain what the standard means (e.g., Young, Cameron, & Tinsley, 
2001). Some jurisdictions have developed and use judicial instructions that aim to define the 
standard for jurors (see Hemmens, Scarborough, & del Carmen, 1997). For example, the 
Federal Judicial Center (1987, Instruction number 21) in the US which is responsible for 
research and education in the federal courts, has defined reasonable doubt as “…proof that 
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt…” In principle, there are four possible 
scenarios that may arise when the judge instructs jurors: reasonable doubt is left undefined 
(i.e., “the defendant is presumed innocent unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt”), a qualitative definition is used (e.g., see above definition by Federal 
Judicial Center, 1987), a quantitative definition is used (e.g., “the defendant is presumed 
innocent unless the evidence against him has at least 90% probability of truth”), or a 
combined qualitative-quantitative definition is used. Researchers have studied the effects of 
these scenarios on interpretations of reasonable doubt (for a review see Horowitz, 1997). 
Kerr et al. (1976) found that interpretations of reasonable doubt were significantly 
higher under a “stringent” qualitative definition (i.e., where doubt must be substantial) than 
under no definition or a “lax” qualitative definition (i.e., where any doubt qualified as 
reasonable doubt). Nagel (1979) reported that interpretations were lower under qualitative 
than quantitative instructions. Kagehiro and Stanton (1985) similarly demonstrated that 
quantitative instructions had the intended effect on reducing guilty verdicts by increasing the 
standard whereas qualitative instructions did not. Later, Kagehiro (1990) reported that 
whereas combined qualitative followed by quantitative instructions did not have the intended 
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effect on verdicts, combined quantitative followed by qualitative instructions did (see also 
Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985). Horowitz and Kirkpatrick (1996) revealed that five different 
qualitative instructions had differential effects on interpretations of the standard. Others have 
also found effects of judicial instructions on reasonable doubt (e.g., Koch & Devine, 1999; 
Montgomery, 1998).  
Methodological Considerations 
Importantly, different studies have employed different methods to measure 
quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt. For example, Hastie et al. (1993), Kagehiro 
(1990), and McCauliff (1982) all used a direct rating method, whereas Nagel (1979) used an 
indirect method. Research on the effects of judicial instructions has mostly employed the 
direct rating method (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Kagehiro, 1990; Kerr et al., 1976; 
Montgomery, 1998).  
Hastie (1993) classified methods as direct and indirect. Two commonly used types of 
methods are the direct rating method (also called minimum probability or self-report 
method), and the decision theory-based method (also called statistical decision theory 
method), which is classified as an indirect method. There are several versions of these two 
types of methods.  
Typically, the direct rating methods asks participants what would be the minimum 
probability that the defendant committed the crime as charged that they would require before 
deciding to convict. Responses may be provided on a 0 to 1 probability scale (or some variant 
such as a 0 to 100 percent scale).  
By contrast, the decision theory-based methods assume that a decision to convict 
should be made if the utility of conviction is greater than that of acquittal (Kaplan, 1968). 
Participants are asked to assign values to the four possible outcomes of a trial (i.e., acquitting 
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the innocent, convicting the guilty, convicting the innocent, and acquitting the guilty). Fried, 
Kaplan, and Klein’s (1975) formula is typical (for a critique see Arkes and Mellers [2002]):   
Decision Criterion = Utility (Acquit Innocent) – Utility (Convict Innocent) 
Utility (Acquit Innocent) – Utility (Convict Innocent) +  
Utility (Convict Guilty) – Utility (Acquit Guilty) 
In a review of studies using these methods, Hastie (1993) concluded that direct 
methods such as the direct rating methods produced higher (or more stringent) interpretations 
of reasonable doubt than did indirect methods such as the decision theory-based methods. 
Indeed, direct rating methods tended to provide interpretations of approximately .80 or above 
whereas decision theory-based methods yielded interpretations from .50 to .55. These 
differences were also apparent within studies using more than one method (e.g., Nagel, 1979; 
see also Connolly’s [1987] discussion of the difference in standards obtained via direct 
probability ratings versus establishing utilities). Thus, direct rating methods appear to 
emphasize an individual’s reluctance to make a false conviction, whereas decision theory-
based methods appear to highlight the undesirability of a false acquittal. 
Dane (1985) empirically compared different methods including the commonly used 
self-report (or direct rating) and statistical decision theory-based methods. Mock jurors were 
presented with three versions of a fictitious trial involving aggravated assault. They read the 
trial transcript along with the judge’s instructions on the standard of proof, completed a 
questionnaire pre-deliberation that obtained information for measuring reasonable doubt 
using the different methods, deliberated in juries to reach a unanimous verdict, and completed 
the questionnaire again post-deliberation. It was found that the mean pre-deliberation (and 
post-deliberation in parentheses) measures of reasonable doubt were: .66 (.70) using the self-
report method and .52 (.52) using the statistical decision theory-based method.  
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In an attempt to examine the validity of each method, Dane (1985) converted the 
interpretations of reasonable doubt measured by each method into verdicts by comparing 
participants’ probability of commission ratings to their interpretations of reasonable doubt as 
elicited by each method, and assuming guilty verdicts if the commission values were greater 
than the reasonable doubt values (otherwise assuming not guilty verdicts). Thus, Dane (1985) 
recreated verdicts, and these were then compared to participants’ actual verdicts to see how 
well they matched. This approach is different from the one of using regression models to 
predict verdicts from measures of reasonable doubt used in the present study. According to 
Dane (1985), the methods accurately recreated the following percentages of verdicts at pre-
deliberation (and post-deliberation in brackets): 77% (73%) for self-report method and 82% 
(85%) for statistical decision theory-based method. Therefore, both methods provided 
verdicts that were congruent with actual verdicts above chance level, although the statistical 
decision theory-based method proved somewhat better than the self-report method. 
 However, to date, no published studies have used measures of reasonable doubt to 
directly predict verdicts, and so the predictive validity of the methods remains unknown. This 
makes it difficult to determine which method ought to be used in future research, and which 
method is capable of capturing people’s “true” interpretations of reasonable doubt. Similarly, 
to date, there is no published research on the intra-individual variability in interpretations of 
reasonable doubt, which like inter-individual variability, may have adverse implications for 
due process requirements and the accuracy of verdicts. Finally, if different methods do yield 
different interpretations of reasonable doubt, it would be useful to know to what extent the 
effects of judicial instructions are attributable to researchers’ choice of direct-rating methods.  
The present paper aims to extend Dane’s (1985) analysis by comparing the predictive 
validity of different methods, examining the extent of both inter- and intra-individual 
variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt indicated by different methods, and 
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determining whether different methods yield different findings on the effects of judicial 
instructions on reasonable doubt. In particular, two commonly used methods (i.e., direct 
rating and decision theory-based) will be compared to a new method that has not been 
previously used in this context. This is the membership function (MF) method (Karelitz et al., 
2000) which can for an individual simultaneously capture both point and variability in 
interpretations, thus providing measures of inter- and intra-individual variability. Next, we 
provide a brief review of this method and the theory that underlies its use.  
Theory of Linguistic Probabilities and the Membership Function Method 
Wallsten and Budescu’s (1995) theory of linguistic probabilities states that phrases 
such as “very likely” can be represented as fuzzy subsets of the probability interval (see also 
Budescu & Wallsten, 1995). Thus, these qualitative probability phrases can be interpreted 
quantitatively. According to the theory, the “membership function” (MF) of a phrase has a 
peak and spread of probabilities. The MF,  pw , for a phrase w evaluated at probability p 
equals 0 if the individual considers p not at all described by w, the function equals 1 if p is 
considered to be absolutely described by w, and it equals a number between 0 and 1 if p is 
considered to be described by w to some degree. The peak (or point) interpretation of a 
phrase is the probability value that is rated the highest on the not at all to absolutely scale for 
its ability to substitute for the phrase. The spread (or range) of interpretation of a phrase 
refers to all those probability values either side of the peak which have a greater than not at 
all rating, indicating that these values can substitute for the phrase but only to some degree. 
Comparing peaks across people shows inter-individual variability whereas the spread within 
people demonstrates intra-individual variability.  
The multi-stimuli MF method that is used to elicit people’s quantitative 
interpretations of probability phrases was developed and validated by Karelitz et al. (2000). 
Briefly, participants are asked to rate the extent to which specific probability values from 0 to 
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1 (in .1 intervals) “substitute” for a phrase (e.g., very likely). Ratings are made on scales from 
0 representing not at all to 100 for absolutely (in 10-point intervals). The responses can be 
joined-up to provide a pictorial representation of the peak and spread of the interpretation of a 
phrase. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical example of an individual’s interpretation of “very 
likely.” As illustrated, the MF for this phrase peaks at .6 with a spread of 8 points from .1 to 
.9. This phrase has one peak, but MFs can be bi/multi-modal or plateau, and this example is 
of a phrase representing a single probability whereas reasonable doubt represents a range of 
probabilities beyond the peak. The MF method can be classified as a direct method.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
It has been shown that the MF method can reliably and validly measure peoples’ 
quantitative interpretations of probability phrases (e.g., Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; Karelitz et 
al., 2000). Past research has found that people have broad interpretations for most phrases in 
their linguistic probability lexicons (e.g., Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick, 1993), that 
interpretations of the same phrase differ across people (e.g., Budescu & Wallsten, 1990), and 
that interpretations may be affected by the context in which a phrase is used (e.g., Cohen & 
Wallsten, 1992; Shapiro & Wallsten, 1994 and Tsao & Wallsten, 1994 both unpublished 
studied cited in Wallsten & Budescu, 1995). The findings on linguistic probabilities using the 
MF method thus appear to mirror those of research on reasonable doubt using other methods. 
Experiment 1 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The main aims of Experiment 1 were to: (1) examine the effect of method (i.e., direct 
rating, decision theory-based, and MF) on measurement of quantitative interpretations of 
reasonable doubt, (2) determine the validity of these methods in terms of their ability to 
predict verdicts, and (3) measure inter- and intra-individual variability in interpretations of 
reasonable doubt. 
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Based on past research on reasonable doubt it was hypothesized that direct methods 
such as the direct rating and MF methods would produce higher mean interpretations of 
reasonable doubt than the indirect, decision theory-based method. Thus, the two direct 
methods were hypothesized to indicate that people aim to minimize false convictions whereas 
the indirect method was hypothesized to show that people aim to reduce false acquittals. 
Second, based on Dane’s (1985) findings, it was hypothesized that direct and indirect 
methods would differ in their ability to predict verdicts, and that indirect methods would be 
more predictively valid (although note that the methods in Dane’s study were used to 
recreate rather than predict verdicts). Finally, based on past research on reasonable doubt and 
linguistic probabilities it was hypothesized that there would be wide inter- and intra-
individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt (at least when undefined).  
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine jury eligible students at the University of Victoria, Canada, 
volunteered to participate. They received two percentage points towards a course. Their mean 
age was 23.60 years, and 81.63% were female. Two participants reported having been called 
for jury service. 
Design. A within-subjects design was employed with three levels of method (i.e., 
direct rating, decision theory-based, and MF). The order of presentation of methods was 
randomized across participants. 
Measures and procedure. Data were collected in small groups and the Experiment 
took approximately 45 minutes to complete. Participants first read a 5-page summary of a 
real criminal trial in the US (California v. Suzanne Johnson, 1998). This was chosen partly 
because Canadian students would likely be unaware of the case, and partly because the 
original trial culminated in a hung jury, which would likely lead to more variance in verdicts 
to be predicted in the present study. However, the original charge was murder and a pilot 
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study indicated that few participants would convict for this charge, but may consider 
conviction for a lesser charge such as manslaughter. Thus, for the present purposes, Suzanne 
Johnson, a 53 year-old day care provider, was tried for the manslaughter (rather than murder) 
of a 6 month-old baby girl in her care. The trial summary included details of the charge and 
penalty, background to the case, the victim’s injuries, the prosecution case, the defense case, 
and the defendant’s statements. (A copy of the trial summary is available from the author.)  
Next, participants read the judge’s typical legal instructions on the presumption of 
innocence, burden of proof, and standard of proof. Regarding the latter, the instructions 
included the following statement “The defendant is presumed innocent unless the prosecution 
has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, the standard is left undefined. 
 Following this, participants completed a three part “Pre-deliberation Questionnaire” 
based on Dane’s (1985). In Part 1, participants rated the probability that the defendant 
committed the crime as charged, their confidence in their verdict, how well they understood 
the judge’s instructions, how confident they were that they obeyed the judge’s instructions, 
how difficult it was for the prosecution to meet the required standard of proof, the strength of 
the prosecution case against the defendant, and the strength of the defense case for the 
defendant. Probabilities were measured on 0-1 scales with .05-point intervals, confidence 
ratings were made on 0-100 scales with 10-point intervals, and the other ratings were made 
on 0-10 scales with 1-point intervals. Participants also made a verdict (i.e., not guilty or 
guilty).  
Part 2 of the questionnaire measured participants’ interpretations of reasonable doubt 
using each of the three methods. In the direct rating method, participants were asked “what is 
the minimum probability for the defendant having committed the crime that he/she is charged 
with which you would require before you convict?” They provided responses by circling a 
 On Measuring Quantitative Interpretations 13 
point a 0% to 100% scale with 5-point intervals. Responses were converted to a probability 
scale for analysis.  
In the decision theory-based method, participants were asked to separately rate the 
value they attached to the four possible outcomes of a criminal trial: convicting a person who 
is innocent, acquitting a person who is guilty, convicting a person who is guilty, and 
acquitting a person who is innocent. Responses were measured on 21-point scales with 1-
point intervals.  
In the MF method, participants were presented with the phrase beyond reasonable 
doubt along with 11 21-point scales labeled not at all to absolutely at each end. Each scale 
corresponds to one of 11 percentage values ordered from 0% to 100% (in 10% intervals; 
these values were converted to probabilities for analysis). These values were presented in the 
same order across participants. Participants were asked to respond to the following question: 
“To what extent, from not at all to absolutely, would each of these percentage values (e.g., 
0%, 10%, etc) substitute for the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt?’ Make sure you circle a 
point on each scale.” 
Finally, Part 3 collected data on participants’ demographic details including their 
gender, age, jury experience, and their prior knowledge of the case. 
Results 
Data from three participants were excluded from analysis because they reported being 
aware of the Johnson case. It is worth noting that 11 of the 49 participants said they found the 
instructions to the MF task confusing such that they used the scale in the reverse direction, 
and so their responses were also excluded from analyses involving the MF method (this 
problem was remedied in Experiment 2). 
 Effect of method on measures of reasonable doubt. The direct rating and the decision 
theory-based methods both yield point interpretations of reasonable doubt, whereas the MF 
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method yields a peak and spread of interpretation. For present purposes, the peak of the MF 
(the probability value that absolutely substitutes for the phrase) was used in data analysis 
unless otherwise stated. 
There were no significant correlations across interpretations of reasonable doubt 
provided by the three methods: r = -.18 for the direct rating and decision theory-based 
methods, r = .11 for the direct rating and MF methods, and r = -.08 for the decision theory-
based and MF methods, ps > .05. Scatter plots (not shown here) ruled out the possibility of 
non-linear relationships existing. Although other factors such as a restricted range would 
reduce the magnitude of a correlation, this was not considered relevant as reasonable doubt is 
not expected to span the entire probability interval, and standard deviations indicated that one 
measure was not restricted compared to others. 
A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of method on 
reasonable doubt, F[2, 66] = 177.99, p = .001, partial η2 = .84. The MF method (peak) 
yielded the highest mean interpretations (M = .96, SD = .10), followed by the direct rating 
method (M = .85, SD = .12), and the decision theory-based method (M = .53, SD = .09). 
Further analyses using paired-sample t-tests indicated that mean interpretations of reasonable 
doubt measured by the three methods were significantly different from each other, t[43] = 
17.01, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 2.31 for direct rating and decision theory-based methods, t[34] = 
4.69, p = .001, d = -1.00 for direct rating and MF methods, and t[33] = 17.45, p = .001, d = -
4.78 for decision theory-based and MF methods.  
 Predicting verdicts. Participants said they had understood the judge’s instructions 
quite well (M = 8.70, SD = 1.23), and were highly confident they had obeyed these 
instructions (M = 79.89, SD = 16.36). The verdicts were fairly evenly split across 
participants: 54.35% rendered a guilty verdict. As would be expected, verdicts (0 = not guilty 
and 1 = guilty) were significantly negatively correlated with participants’ ratings of the 
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strength of the defense case (r = -.52, p = .001) and significantly positively correlated with 
their ratings of the strength of the prosecution case (r = .53, p = .001). Similarly, as expected, 
the mean rating of the probability that the defendant committed the crime as charged was 
significantly greater for participants who rendered a guilty verdict (M = .82, SD = .11) than 
those who voted not guilty (M = .48, SD = .20), t[30] = 7.12, p = .001, d = 2.11. Also as 
expected, participants who voted not guilty said it was significantly more difficult for the 
prosecution to meet the required standard of proof (M = 7.52, SD = 1.50) than those who 
voted guilty (M = 5.84, SD = 2.64), t[39] = 2.71, p = .010, d = -0.78. Participants who voted 
guilty were significantly more confident in their verdicts (M = 78.54, SD = 14.02) than those 
who voted not guilty (M = 55.48, SD = 24.13), t[31] = 3.85, p = .001, d = 1.17. 
The validity of the three methods in predicting verdicts was examined by computing 
separate binary logistic regression analyses where the interpretations of reasonable doubt 
elicited by each method were used to predict participants’ verdicts. All three models were 
statistically significant and predicted verdicts above chance level (i.e., 54%), 2[1, N = 46] = 
4.24, p = .039, phi = .03 for direct rating method, 2[1, N = 44] = 4.65, p = .031, phi = .33 for 
decision theory-based method, and 2[1, N = 35] = 6.39, p = .011, phi = .43 for MF method. 
Specifically, the methods accurately predicted the following percent of verdicts: 60.87% for 
direct rating method, 63.64% for decision theory-based method, and 62.86% for MF method.  
Finally, a logistic regression model was computed to predict verdicts in which 
interpretations of reasonable doubt captured by the three methods were entered 
simultaneously as predictors. It was found that the model accurately predicted 76.47% of 
verdicts (2[3, N = 34] = 4.24, p = .001, phi = .35), and only the measures provided by the 
direct rating and MF methods were significant predictors, ps < .05. 
Inter- and intra-individual variability in reasonable doubt. The direct rating method 
showed the greatest inter-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt (i.e., 
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range = .75), followed by the decision theory-based method (i.e., range = .56). The MF 
method showed the least inter-individual variability in interpretations (i.e., range = .40).  
For interest, Figure 2 illustrates the average MF of reasonable doubt across 
participants, showing the peak and spread of interpretations. As mentioned earlier, the MF 
method is capable of capturing intra-individual differences in interpretations by analyzing the 
spread/range (rather than peak) of the MF. Across participants, the mean spread of the MF 
was .52 (SD of range = .35), with four participants showing no spread and six indicating that 
reasonable doubt represented to some degree values along the whole 0-1 probability interval.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that different methods produce different quantitative 
interpretations of reasonable doubt. As hypothesized, direct methods (i.e., direct rating and 
MF methods) produced higher mean interpretations of the standard than the indirect, decision 
theory-based method. The two commonly used methods (i.e., direct rating and decision 
theory-based methods) on average yielded values of reasonable doubt of .85 and .53, 
respectively, which is consistent with past research (see Hastie, 1993). By contrast, the MF 
method, which has not previously been used in this context, yielded an average value of .96. 
Thus, whereas the decision theory-based method suggests that people aim to reduce false 
acquittals, the direct rating and MF methods suggest they focus on reducing false convictions.  
In support of our prediction, and consistent with past research on reasonable doubt 
(e.g., McCauliff, 1982) and linguistic probabilities (see Wallsten & Budescu, 1995), all three 
methods showed wide inter-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt. The 
greatest variability was indicated by the direct rating method, whereas the MF method 
indicated the least variability. These findings may reflect real variability that exists or may 
suggest that the latter method is used more consistently across participants.  
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Also as hypothesized, and consistent with past research on linguistic probabilities (see 
Wallsten & Budescu, 1995), the MF method revealed intra-individual variability in 
interpretations of reasonable doubt as the spread of the MF suggested that most participants 
took the standard to represent to some degree probability values below and above their 
absolute interpretation. Indeed, for most participants reasonable doubt represented values 
along half of the 0-1 probability interval. This is the first study of intra-individual variability 
in interpretations of reasonable doubt.  
These findings on inter- and intra-individual variability raise concerns about the 
consistency of juror behavior. Inter-individual variability suggests that different jurors may 
find it difficult to reach consensus on a verdict (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966), whereas intra-
individual variability suggests that the same juror may arrive at a different verdict on the 
same or similar case on another occasion if the juror uses a value along the spread of the MF 
as the threshold. However, as Heffer (2006) points out, there is no legal consensus that 
reasonable doubt should be fixed (see also Stoffelmayr & Diamond, 2000). Nevertheless, it is 
worth exploring the extent to which such variability is driven by systematic factors rather 
than being random. Identifying the effect of systematic factors can help to develop strategies 
to minimize variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt. Experiment 2 provided data to 
enable initial exploration of this issue by examining the effect of judicial instructions. 
 Participants were fairly evenly divided in their verdicts on the case. Logistic 
regression analyses showed that all three methods accurately predicted verdicts above chance 
level. Furthermore, although all three methods, as hypothesized, differed in their ability to 
accurately predict verdicts, the difference was negligible, and the decision theory-based 
method did not do as well in the full model. The predictive validities of the direct rating and 
decision theory-based methods were somewhat lower than the validities reported by Dane 
(1985) who recreated verdicts. Dane (1985) used participants’ probability of commission 
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values, which are necessarily related to actual verdicts, to also assume the verdicts 
determined by the reasonable doubt standard measured by each method. This increases the 
likelihood that the verdicts generated by the methods matched actual verdicts and so inflates 
the estimated validity of each method.  
The fact that the three methods yielded uncorrelated interpretations of reasonable 
doubt suggests that either they contain measurement error or that they may be capturing 
unique and useful components of the concept of reasonable doubt. A closer examination of 
each method indicates potential sources of the differences across methods. For instance, the 
direct rating method asks for the minimum probability value that represents reasonable doubt, 
whereas the MF method (peak) is the probability value that absolutely substitutes for the 
phrase, and the decision theory-based method asks for the utility of the outcomes of a 
criminal trial. The two direct methods may also have in common an ability to draw people’s 
attention to the goal of reducing false convictions by focusing them on the likelihood of the 
event (i.e., person committing the crime). By contrast, the indirect method may draw people’s 
attention to the goal of reducing false acquittals by focusing them on the value of the outcome 
of the trial. A triangulated approach to studying reasonable doubt may be useful. 
Before drawing firm conclusions about the effect of method on reasonable doubt, it is 
worth noting that Experiment 1 demonstrated the effect of method within the context of a 
manslaughter case. Past research, mostly using the direct rating method, suggests that offence 
type may influence interpretations of reasonable doubt (Martin & Schum, 1987; 
Montgomery, 1998; Simon, 1969; 1970; Simon & Mahan, 1971). Thus, the interpretations of 
reasonable doubt obtained in Experiment 1 may not necessarily generalize to cases involving 
other offence types. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the effect of method 
would differ across offence types. Rather, a meaningful analysis may be to compare the effect 
of method outside of case context. Experiment 2 provided data to enable such analysis.  
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Finally, if different methods consistently yield different findings, then it is useful to 
establish the implications of using each of the three methods for researching specific issues 
such as the effect of judicial instructions on interpretations of reasonable doubt. As stated 
earlier, past research has reported that instructions do influence interpretations (e.g., Kagehrio 
& Stanton, 1985; Nagel, 1979). Interestingly, this body of research has mostly employed the 
direct rating method, and so it is unclear if the findings would be supported if another method 
was employed. Therefore, Experiment 2 was designed to examine the robustness of the 
findings on the effect of judicial instructions on reasonable doubt.  
Experiment 2 
Aims and Hypotheses 
The main aims of Experiment 2 were to: (1) examine the effect of judicial instructions 
on quantitative interpretations of reasonable doubt as measured by the direct rating, decision 
theory-based, and the MF methods, (2) explore the extent of inter- and intra-individual 
variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt across judicial instructions, and (3) replicate 
the results of Experiment 1 on the effect of method on reasonable doubt outside of case 
context.  
Based on past research on the effect of judicial instructions (Kagehiro & Stanton, 
1985; Nagel, 1979), it was predicted that according to the direct rating method quantitative 
instructions would yield higher interpretations of reasonable doubt than qualitative 
instructions or when the standard is undefined (there is insufficient past research to make an a 
priori prediction about the effect of instructions using the decision theory-based and MF 
methods). Second, although there is a lack of previous research to make a priori predictions 
about inter- and intra-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt across 
judicial instructions, it may be appropriate to expect less variability under quantitative than 
qualitative instructions or when the standard is undefined. This is because quantitative 
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instructions might better narrow the possible range of interpretations that an individual may 
have. Finally, it was expected that the results of the effect of method on reasonable doubt 
reported in Experiment 1 that were obtained in the context of a manslaughter case would be 
replicated outside of case context in Experiment 2.  
Method 
Participants. Two-hundred and three jury eligible students at the University of 
Victoria, Canada, volunteered to participate. They received two percentage points towards a 
course. Their mean age was 20.12 years, and 75.77% were female. Three participants 
reported having been called for jury service. 
Design. A 3 x 3 mixed factorial design was employed with judicial instructions (i.e., 
undefined, qualitative, quantitative) as the between-subjects factor and method (i.e., direct 
rating, decision theory-based, and MF methods) as the within-subjects factor. The order of 
presentation of methods was randomized across participants. 
Measures and procedure. Data were collected in small groups and the Experiment 
took approximately 30 minutes to complete. Participants first read the judge’s instructions. In 
the undefined condition the instructions were as follows: “The defendant is presumed 
innocent unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The qualitative 
instructions were: “The defendant is presumed innocent, and the law does not require the 
prosecution to prove a defendant guilty beyond all possible doubt, and neither is it sufficient 
to prove that the defendant is probably guilty.” Finally, the quantitative instructions were: 
“The defendant is presumed innocent unless the evidence against the defendant has at least 
90% probability of truth.” 
 Participants then completed a questionnaire that measured their interpretations of 
reasonable doubt using each of the three methods described in Experiment 1. The instructions 
for the MF task were, however, made clearer to avoid confusion: “Imagine that you had to 
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use a number instead of the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’ To what extent does each of 
the numbers below (e.g., 0%, 10%, etc) substitute for the phrase? If you think the phrase can 
not at all be substituted by the number then circle the left-most point on the scale. If you 
think the phrase can be absolutely substituted by the number then circle the right-most point 
on the scale. If you think the phrase can be somewhat substituted by the number then circle a 
point somewhere along the scale in-between the left- and right-most points on the scale that 
represents your thought. Make sure you circle a point on each scale.” 
Finally, data were collected on participants’ demographic details including gender, 
age, and jury experience. 
Results 
 Effect of judicial instructions on reasonable doubt. Of the 203 participants, five did 
not complete the direct rating task, two did not complete the decision theory task, and 17 did 
not complete the MF task. The peak of the MF for reasonable doubt was used when analyzing 
the data from the MF method unless otherwise stated. None of the participants reported being 
confused with the MF task. 
There were no significant correlations among the interpretations of reasonable doubt 
as measured by the three methods across the judicial instructions (this was also the case for 
within instructions): r = -.01 for the direct rating and decision theory-based methods, r = .08 
for the direct rating and MF methods, and r = -.07 for the decision theory-based and MF 
methods, ps > .05. Scatter plots (not shown here) again ruled out the possibility of non-linear 
relations. As before, other factors such as restricted range could also not account for the lack 
of significant correlations. 
A mixed ANOVA was computed to examine the effect of judicial instructions and 
method on interpretations of reasonable doubt. Judicial instruction was the between-subjects 
factor and method was the within-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of 
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method on interpretations of reasonable doubt, F[2, 346] = 553.58, p = .001, partial η2 = .76 
(see Table 1). There was no significant main effect of judicial instructions on interpretations, 
F[2, 173] = 0.76, p = .469, partial η2 = .01 (see Table 1). However, there was a small, but 
statistically significant interaction effect of judicial instructions by method on interpretations 
of reasonable doubt, F[4, 346] = 3.68, p = .006, partial η2 = .04 (see Table 1). Further 
analyses using one-way ANOVAs showed that the interpretations of reasonable doubt 
measured by the decision theory-based and MF methods did not vary significantly across the 
three judicial instructions, ps > .05. However, although the effect is small, the interpretations 
measured by the direct rating method significantly increased from the undefined condition to 
the condition with quantitative instructions, F[2,197] = 4.09, p = .018, partial η2 = .04.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 Inter- and intra-individual variability in reasonable doubt. As Table 2 shows, all 
three methods showed greatest inter-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable 
doubt under the qualitative instructions (i.e., range = .95 for direct rating method, range = .68 
for decision theory-based method, and range = .50 for MF method). The MF method showed 
least inter-individual variability in interpretations under the quantitative instructions (range = 
.20), whereas this was the case for the direct rating and decision theory-based methods in the 
undefined condition (i.e., range = .75 for direct rating method and range = .62 for decision 
theory-based method).  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
With regard to the effect of instructions on intra-individual variability in 
interpretations, a one-way ANOVA revealed that there were no significant differences in the 
spread of the MF for reasonable doubt across the different instructions, F[2, 183] = 1.41, p = 
.247, partial η2 = .02. The mean spread of the MF across instruction conditions was .59 (SD 
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of range = .32), with 8 participants showing no spread and 14 indicating that reasonable 
doubt represented to some degree values along the whole 0-1 probability interval. 
Replication outside of case context. The data from the undefined condition in 
Experiment 2 were analyzed to determine the extent to which the results of Experiment 1 
were replicated outside of case context. A within-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of method on reasonable doubt, F[2, 124] = 205.15, p = .001, partial η2 = .77. The 
MF method (peak) yielded the highest mean interpretation of reasonable doubt (M = .98, SD 
= .06), followed by the direct rating method (M = .77, SD = .19), and the decision theory-
based method (M = .53, SD = .10). Indeed, these statistics are close to those reported in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., M = .96 and SD = .10 for MF method, M = .85 and SD = .12 for direct 
rating method, and M = .53 and SD = .09 for decision theory-based method). Similarly, 
further analyses indicated that mean interpretations of reasonable doubt measured by the 
three methods were significantly different from each other, t[66] = 6.02, p = .001, d = 1.43 
for direct rating and decision theory-based methods, t[63] = 8.90, p = .001, d = -1.49 for 
direct rating and MF methods, and t[64] = 32.13, p = .001, d = -5.08 for decision theory-
based and MF methods. 
Discussion 
The main effect of method found in the analysis of data from the undefined condition 
in Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 on the effect of method on 
interpretations of reasonable doubt outside of case context. Indeed, there is no reason to 
believe that the effect of method should differ across offence types or from a case to no case 
context, even though interpretations of reasonable doubt may themselves differ. Consistent 
with Experiment 1, the average values of reasonable doubt obtained outside of case context in 
Experiment 2 were higher for the direct methods (i.e., direct rating and MF methods) than the 
indirect, decision theory-based method. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, there were no 
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significant correlations among interpretations of reasonable doubt provided by the three 
methods.  
In support of our prediction, Experiment 2 demonstrated that the direct rating method 
yields on average significantly higher interpretations of reasonable doubt under quantitative 
instructions than when the standard is left undefined. This is consistent with past research 
(Kagehiro & Stanton, 1985; Nagel, 1979). To add to this literature, and in contrast to the 
effect observed using the direct rating method, it was revealed that interpretations of 
reasonable doubt provided by both the decision theory-based and MF methods did not differ 
significantly under different judicial instructions. In addition, instructions did not have a 
significant effect on intra-individual variability in interpretations captured by the MF method. 
According to all three methods inter-individual variability was greatest under the qualitative 
instructions. It was only the MF method that revealed the expected finding of least inter-
individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt under quantitative instructions.  
The present findings imply that previous research findings concerning the effect of 
judicial instructions on reasonable doubt may have been affected by the method used to 
measure interpretations of reasonable doubt. Indeed, most of the past research on the effect of 
judicial instructions has used the direct rating method (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; 
Kagehiro, 1990; Kerr et al., 1976; Montgomery, 1998). One explanation for the effect 
demonstrated by the direct rating method is that instructions may only impact the minimum 
value of reasonable doubt captured by this method. Alternatively, and consistent with the 
present findings, there are reasons to believe that instructions would not necessarily impact 
interpretations. Jurors are active information processors and they use commonsense, so they 
may reject or amend instructions, particularly if they conflict with their sense of justice (e.g., 
Dann, 1993; Finkel, 1995). Courts are also often ineffective in communicating the standard to 
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lay jurors (Heffer, 2006). Future research could probe into the issue of the sensitivity or 
susceptibility of different methods to the effects of judicial instructions on reasonable doubt. 
Meanwhile, it may be wise to postpone policy discussions concerning the utility of 
different judicial instructions until further research is conducted using various methods. 
Adoption of specific instructions also ought to take into account their impact on intra- and 
inter-individual variability in interpretations of reasonable doubt. The present findings 
suggest that qualitative instructions may be problematic since they tend to increase inter-
individual variability, which may make it difficult for jurors to agree on a verdict. On the 
other hand, there has been widespread objection to the use of quantitative instructions (Notes, 
1995). It should be noted that the present study used only one example of a qualitative and 
quantitative instruction and so replication is necessary using other such instructions, as well 
as instructions that may combine both quantitative and qualitative elements.  
General Discussion 
The present findings have several implications. First, people interpreted the standard 
either below the .90 probability generally agreed by judges and law-makers (according to the 
direct rating and decision theory-based methods), or above the threshold (according the MF 
method). Effort should be made to bring people’s interpretations of reasonable doubt closer to 
that intended. 
Second, all three methods showed wide inter-individual variability in interpretations 
of reasonable doubt measured in terms of range (which was greater under qualitative 
instructions), and the MF method also revealed intra-individual variability. This raises 
concerns about the ability of jurors to agree on a verdict as well as the consistency of 
individual jurors’ verdicts. Future research could further explore the sources of such 
variability, so that strategies can be designed to minimize variability.  
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Third, the effect of judicial instructions on interpretations of reasonable doubt were 
only apparent using the direct rating method, but not the decision theory-based nor MF 
methods. This questions the reliability and validity of past research findings on judicial 
instructions. Legal policy-makers and practitioners may wish to postpone use of instructions 
or at least be cautious of their use. Choice of instructions ought to be informed by knowledge 
of whether they have the desired impact on peoples’ understanding of reasonable doubt, 
while ensuring that they do not increase variability in interpretations. In fact, the MF method 
can be used to determine how people interpret particular phrases such as “firmly convinced” 
that may form part of a qualitative instruction by identifying phrases with little inter- and 
intra-individual variability (spread) and whose MFs typically peak at .90 probability. 
Finally, the interpretations of reasonable doubt captured by the three methods were 
uncorrelated, and the three methods predicted verdicts equally well. These methods appear to 
capture different aspects of the concept of reasonable doubt. Future research ought to seek 
further evidence of the relative and combined predictive validity of the methods. For now, it 
may be prudent for researchers to use a triangulated approach to studying reasonable doubt. 
Alternatively, researchers may use a method on grounds of practicality or the type of 
questions it can help answer (see also Connolly, 1987).  
Balancing the Evidence for the Membership Function Method 
The present paper introduced the MF method to the study of standards of proof. This 
method represents a viable addition/alternative to the direct rating and decision theory-based 
methods. One unique advantage of the MF method is that it captures intra-individual 
variability in interpretations of a phrase. Another advantage is that the reliability and validity 
of the MF method has been repeatedly confirmed (e.g., Dhami & Wallsten, 2005; Karelitz et 
al., 2000). Indeed, Dhami and Wallsten (2005) demonstrated that the MF method can capture 
quantitative interpretations of probability phrases in individuals’ unique lexicons and that 
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these interpretations can predict how individuals use their phrases. A third advantage lies in 
the fact that the MF method showed the least inter-individual variability in interpretations 
(measured either in terms of range or standard deviation), implying that it may be used fairly 
consistently across individuals. 
The MF method also has the advantage of direct methods. For instance, the direct 
methods present participants with a fairly simple task (although it may be argued that people 
are not necessarily familiar with using probability scales). By contrast, the decision theory-
based method presents a relatively more complex task which may seem peculiar (e.g., asking 
for the utility of convicting the innocent). As an indirect method, the decision theory-based 
method also requires more assumptions on the part of the researcher in converting utilities to 
a criterion value and some have commented on the difficulties of establishing a consistent set 
of utilities (e.g., Connolly, 1987; although Arkes and Mellers [2002] present a formula, that 
has not been used to date, which avoids asking peculiar questions and which they claim is 
more representative of what jurors may do if they wish to maximize utility). 
However, the MF method also has some of the limitations of direct methods, as well 
as other potential limitations. For instance, direct methods may be more prone to social 
desirability response bias. In addition, asking participants the extent to which values along 
the probably scale at .1 intervals substitute for a phrase inevitably means that the quantitative 
interpretation of any phrase provided by the MF method is not as fine-grained as it would be 
if the intervals were smaller (e.g., .05). This may partly explain why the interpretations of 
reasonable doubt and the intra-individual variability in interpretations were so great. Yet, 
there is a trade-off between using smaller intervals and the time taken to complete the task. 
Similarly, presenting probability values in the same ascending order across participants in the 
MF method may encourage them to respond in a certain way (e.g., increase MF for values as 
they ascend). However, this order is not inherent to the method and can be changed, although 
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it might add noise to the data by making the task more difficult. Regardless, it is clear that the 
MF method is amenable to revisions that enhance the efficiency of data collection while 
retaining its theoretical properties.  
Strengths and Limitations 
The present research used methods and procedures that are typical of jury research in 
general and research on standards of proof in particular. Nevertheless, it could be argued that 
the external validity of the present findings is limited because they are based on research 
involving participants who may not be representative of actual jurors, that reasonable doubt 
was examined in either no case context or in the context of a written summary of a case 
which diverges from the detailed oral and visual representations available at a real trial, and 
that reasonable doubt and verdicts were only measured at the pre-deliberation stage. For the 
reasons outlined below, these apparent limitations are minimized in the present research. 
It would be inappropriate to study real juries in real trial situations, for ethical reasons 
when one is manipulating a variable such as judicial instructions, and for pragmatic reasons 
when one wants to conduct a robust study using a within-subjects design since the same jury 
will not try the same case more than once. Regardless, the present findings may be 
considered representative, reliable, and valid for several reasons. First, the mock (student) 
jurors in the present research were jury eligible and a few said they had been called for jury 
service. Some studies have also shown few differences between mock and real jurors (e.g., 
MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). Second, effort was made to use a detailed summary of a real trial 
rather than a brief description of a fictitious trial. Additionally, Bornstein (1999) concluded 
that there was little negative impact on the validity of studies using student mock jurors and 
written presentations of trial material. Finally, there is some evidence that the pre-deliberation 
distribution of verdicts influences the post-deliberation verdict (e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; 
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Newkirk, 1981; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995), and that interpretations of reasonable doubt differ 
very little from pre- to post-deliberation (Dane, 1985; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996).  
Concluding Remarks 
The present findings highlight the need to re-evaluate the reliability and validity of 
past research findings on quantifying reasonable doubt and on the effects of judicial 
instructions on reasonable doubt, since they may have been affected by the method used to 
measure interpretations. The present findings can also help future researchers choose the 
appropriate method when studying standards of proof, by emphasizing the advantages and 
limitations of different methods, and the potential for a triangulated approach. Gaining a 
better understanding of how people interpret standards of proof such as beyond reasonable 
doubt can help legal professionals appreciate how it is used by jurors, and how they may be 
assisted to use it appropriately.  
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Table 1.  
Means and Standard Deviations of Interpretations of Reasonable Doubt by Method and 
Judicial Instructions 
 
 
 
Judicial 
Instructions 
Method 
Direct Rating Decision Theory-
Based 
Membership 
Function 
M SD M SD M SD 
Undefined  .77 .19 .53 .10 .98 .06 
Qualitative  .79 .20 .54 .10 .95 .10 
Quantitative  .85 .17 .52 .08 .96 .05 
Total .80 .19 .53 .09 .96 .07 
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Table 2.  
Inter-Individual Variability – Ranges of Interpretations of Reasonable Doubt by Method and 
Judicial Instructions 
 
 
 
Judicial 
Instructions 
Method 
Direct Rating Decision Theory-
Based 
Membership 
Function 
Range Range Range 
Undefined  .75 .62 .40 
Qualitative  .95 .68 .50 
Quantitative  .90 .64 .20 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example membership function of probability phrase ‘very likely’. 
Figure 2. Mean membership function of reasonable doubt across participants with 95% 
confidence intervals in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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